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AO 106 (Rev. 04/10) Application for a Search Warrant

APR 27 2018

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

AT SEATTLE
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
BY DEPUTY

for the

Western District of Washington

In the Matter of the Search of

*(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)*

Five (5) Target Facebook Accounts, as further described in Attachment A.

Case No.

MJ18-197

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property *(identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location)*:

Five (5) Target Facebook Accounts, as further described in Attachment A.

located in the Northern District of California, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B for list of items to be seized.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- ☒ evidence of a crime;
- ☒ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- ☒ property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- ☐ a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section
21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846
21 U.S.C. § 960 and 963

Offense Description
Distribution of controlled substances and conspiracy; Importation of controlled substances and conspiracy

The application is based on these facts:

See affidavit of Special Agent Terry D. Stinson

- ☒ Continued on the attached sheet.
- ☐ Delayed notice of _____ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: _____) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Timothy J. [Signature]

Applicant's signature

Terry D. Stinson, CGIS Special Agent

Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date:

April 27, 2018

[Handwritten signature]
Judge's signature

Judge's signature

City and state: **Seattle, Washington**

United States Magistrate Judge Mary Alice Theiler

Printed name and title

ATTACHMENT A

Property to Be Searched

This warrant applies to information associated with the following five Facebook accounts, which are stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Facebook, a company headquartered in Menlo Park, California:

- Facebook account name “Mariana Garcia,” Facebook ID number 100003627691482
- Facebook account name “Fuerte Jackelin,” web address www.facebook.com/jackelin.ahumada
- Facebook account name “Jack Tekeroi,” Facebook ID number 100024259201484
- Facebook account name “Mile Garcia,” Facebook ID number 100012467522033
- Facebook account name “Jacky Garces,” Facebook ID number 100017655935159

ATTACHMENT B

Particular Things to be Seized

I. Information to be disclosed by Facebook

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, custody, or control of Facebook, including any messages, records, files, logs, or information that have been deleted but are still available to Facebook, or have been preserved pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), Facebook is required to disclose the following information to the government for each user ID listed in Attachment A:

- (a) All contact and personal identifying information, including full name, user identification number, birth date, gender, contact e-mail addresses, Facebook passwords, Facebook security questions and answers, physical address (including city, state, country, and zip code), telephone numbers, screen names, websites, and other personal identifiers.
- (b) All activity logs for the account and all other documents showing the user's posts and other Facebook activities;
- (c) All photos and videos uploaded by that user ID and all photos and videos uploaded by any user that have that user tagged in them;
- (d) All original photos containing original EXIF data;
- (e) All profile information; News Feed information; status updates; links to videos, photographs, articles, and other items; Notes; Wall postings; friend lists, including the friends' Facebook user identification numbers; groups and networks of which the user is a member, including the groups' Facebook group identification numbers; future and past event postings; rejected "Friend" requests;

comments; gifts; pokes; tags; and information about the user's access and use of Facebook applications;

- (f) All other records of communications and messages made or received by the user, including all private messages, chat history, video calling history, and pending "Friend" requests;
- (g) All "check ins" and other location information;
- (h) All IP logs, including all records of the IP addresses that logged into the account;
- (i) All records of the account's usage of the "Like" feature, including all Facebook posts and all non-Facebook webpages and content that the user has "liked";
- (j) All information about the Facebook pages that the account is or was a "fan" of;
- (k) All information about the Facebook pages that the account is or was a "following";
- (l) All past and present lists of friends created by the account;
- (m) All records of Facebook searches performed by the account;
- (n) All information about the user's access and use of Facebook Marketplace;
- (o) The types of service utilized by the user;
- (p) The length of service (including start date) and the means and source of any payments associated with the service (including any credit card or bank account number);
- (q) All privacy settings and other account settings, including privacy settings for individual Facebook posts and activities, and all records showing which Facebook users have been blocked by the account;

- (r) All records pertaining to communications between Facebook and any person regarding the user or the user's Facebook account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken.
- (s) Any and all location information associated with the Facebook account identified in attachment A. This could be general information such as the state and city the user identifies as their home on their Facebook profile, more refined information such as business names and addresses of places the user has "Checked In" at, the most precise information such as GPS latitude and longitude coordinates obtained when the user is active on Facebook, where postings were associated with, where a picture was taken, and where the user was when a post or message was created.

II. Information to be seized by the government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of violations of Title 21, Sections 841(a)(1), 846, 960, and 963 in 2016 and later, including, for each user ID identified on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:

- (a) The importation and other distribution and transportation of controlled substances, including preparatory steps and follow up actions related to any such scheme;
- (b) Payment or planned payment or compensation in any form for any such importation or distribution of controlled substances;

- (c) Recruitment or attempted recruitment or retention of any participants or prospective participants in any such scheme to import or otherwise distribute controlled substances;
- (d) Records relating to who created, used, or communicated with the user IDs, about matters relating to the crimes described above, including records that help reveal their identities and whereabouts.
- (e) Evidence indicating how and when the Facebook account was accessed or used, to determine the chronological and geographic context of account access, use, and events relating to the crimes described above.
- (f) All subscriber records associated with the specified accounts, including name, address, local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations, length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized, telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address, and means and source of payment for such service including any credit card or bank account number.
- (g) Any and all other log records, including IP address captures, associated with the specified accounts;
- (h) Any records of communications between Facebook and any person about issues relating to the account, such as technical problems, billing inquiries, or complaints from other users about the specified account. This to include records of contacts between the subscriber and the provider's support services, as well as records of any actions taken by the provider or subscriber as a result of the communications.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
)
 COUNTY OF KING)

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I, Coast Guard Investigative Service Special Agent Terry D. Stinson, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant for information associated with a Facebook user ID that is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Facebook, a social networking company headquartered in Menlo Park, California. The information to be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachment A. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a search warrant under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2703(b)(1)(A) and 2703(c)(1)(A) to require Facebook to disclose to the government records (including the content of communications) further described in Section I of Attachment B. Upon receipt of the information described in Section I of Attachment B, government-authorized persons will review that information to locate the items described in Section II of Attachment B.

2. I am a Special Agent (S/A) with the U. S. Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS), and have been since October 2009. Until March, 2018, I was an active duty member of the Coast Guard. I am now a Special Agent employed by the Coast Guard as a civilian. During my Coast Guard career, I have participated in multiple aspects of federal law enforcement within that timeframe. Currently, I am assigned to the CGIS, Northwest Region office in Seattle, WA. In my official capacity, I have investigated violations of federal and state law along with violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. My training includes attending

1 both the Criminal Investigators Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement
2 Training Center as well as the Naval Criminal Investigative Service's Special
3 Agent Basic Training Program. As part of my duties as a CGIS S/A, I have
4 investigated drug trafficking organizations and their ability to traffic cocaine,
5 methamphetamine, and heroin globally. I have conducted and/or participated in
6 numerous investigations involving allegations, such as; sexual assault, rape,
7 international drug smuggling, money laundering, drug manufacturing, robbery,
8 weapons smuggling, alien smuggling, and child pornography. I have worked, led,
9 and participated in multiple drug trafficking investigations and operations during
10 my career. My training also encompasses other investigative experiences and
11 training not enumerated herein.
12

13 3. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my
14 training and experience, and information obtained from other officers, agents, and
15 witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient
16 probable cause for the requested warrant and does not set forth all of my
17 knowledge about this matter.

18 4. Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this
19 affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that violations of Title 21, United
20 States Code, Sections 841(a)(1), 846 (distribution of controlled substances and
21 conspiracy), 960 and 963 (importation of controlled substances and conspiracy)
22 have been committed by persons including Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA
23 GARCES, aka JACQUELIN, and others. There also is probable cause to search
24 the information described in Attachment A and Section I of Attachment B for
25 evidence of these crimes, as described in Section II of Attachment B.
26
27
28

THE INVESTIGATION

5. **Summary:** This affidavit is in support of a search warrant for Facebook account name "Mariana Garcia," Facebook ID number 100003627691482, which will hereafter be referred to as "**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3**," Facebook account name "Fuerte Jackelin," web address www.facebook.com/jackelin.ahumada, which will hereafter be referred to as "**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4**," Facebook account name "Jack Tekerai," Facebook ID number 100024259201484, which will hereafter be referred to "**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5**," Facebook account name "Mile Garcia," Facebook ID number 100012467522033, which will hereafter be referred to "**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 6**," and Facebook account name "Jacky Garces," Facebook ID number 100017655935159, which will hereafter be referred to as "**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7**." As described below, I obtained earlier search warrants for two accounts identified previously as TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2. At this time, I am only seeking an additional warrant for **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNTS 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.**

6. As detailed below, **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNTS 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7** are utilized by Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES, aka JACQUELIN. The investigation has shown that AHUMADA GARCES uses **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNTS 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7** and other Facebook accounts to recruit and coordinate professional mariners to smuggle controlled

1 substances from South and Central America to North America and Europe via
2 commercial container vessels.

3 7. **Motor Vessel (M/V) CAP JACKSON Seizure:** On September 3,
4 2016, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) seized approximately 196
5 kilograms of cocaine that had been smuggled to British Columbia on board the
6 container ship M/V (Motor Vessel) *Cap Jackson*. Refua KABUTA, aka Rebuta
7 KABUTA, is a professional mariner from the Republic of Kiribati who was a
8 crewmember of the M/V *Cap Jackson* at the time of the seizure. According to a
9 crewmember interviewed later who admitted bringing a package onboard the M/V
10 *Cap Jackson* in Colombia, KABUTA and at least one other mariner had attempted
11 to lower that package (which turned out to be a load of cocaine) to an awaiting
12 vessel when the M/V *Cap Jackson* departed the Fraser River in British Columbia,
13 Canada. A pilot boat noticed the package, retrieved it, and turned it over to
14 Canadian authorities. KABUTA's name appears on the friends list for TARGET
15 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2.

17 8. After the seizure in Canada, the M/V *Cap Jackson* sailed to
18 Oakland, California, where U.S. law enforcement officials boarded the vessel on
19 September 7, 2016. During that operation, officers recovered the Colombian
20 telephone number 57-3013615307 labeled as "Kimmy". Also located in
21 KABUTA's mobile telephone was the British Columbia telephone number (604)
22 704-1178. Analysis showed that KABUTA's mobile telephone communicated
23 with 57-3013615307 September 2, 2016, prior to the attempted at-sea transfer of
24 the cocaine, and then KABUTA's phone began communicating with the telephone
25 number (604) 704-1178 on September 2 and 3, 2016.
26
27
28

9. On October 8, 2016, I assisted U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with the secondary inspection of Rehua KABUTA at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) as he traveled to Kiribati through the United States. During the secondary inspection of KABUTA, CBP officers located in KABUTA's personal belongings a mini composition notebook with "R Kabuta Notebook" handwritten on the cover. The back cover of the notebook contained a handwritten notation of the British Columbia mobile telephone number (604) 704-1178. With the assistance of RCMP, the telephone number (604) 704-1178 was identified as being subscribed to by a person who had recently traveled to Colombia. Canadian phone records also showed that the phone, on the night the cocaine was dropped into the water, was in the vicinity of a marina near the cocaine drop-off site. Also located in KABUTA's notebook was the handwritten email address BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com with the name "Jackkie" written below it. As detailed below, the investigation has shown that Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES, aka JACQUELIN, identified her email address as BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com in two Western Union money transfers in which she sent funds from Panama to Colombia. An unlabeled Colombian telephone number, 57-3008717105 was located in KABUTA's mobile telephone along with the unlabeled British Columbia mobile telephone number, (604) 704-1178.

10. Located in KABUTA's notebook were multiple handwritten Western Union money transfer control numbers (MTCN) for individuals in names other than his own. According to KABUTA's notebook, two of the MTCN's, 106-360-6406 and 471-152-2649, were associated to a "Rawata ITINNEITA". Western Union information showed both MTCN's were initiated on August 29, 2016, by an individual from two separate locations in Panama City, Panama and

1 were paid to a Ratawa ITINNEITA in Kiribati. Both wires were for \$1,934.69
2 each in U.S. funds. According to Western Union, ITINNEITA also received a wire
3 from Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES, aka JACQUELIN.

4 11. **M/V RIO DE JANEIRO Seizure:** According to open source
5 reporting, on October 20, 2016, Teisi BURATAAKE was one of nine Kiribati
6 crewmembers arrested by Italian law enforcement in an attempted cocaine
7 smuggling event in Gioia Tauro, Italy. BURATAAKE and eight other Kiribati
8 crewmembers allegedly attempted to smuggle approximately 385 kilograms of
9 cocaine from South America onboard the M/V *Rio de Janeiro* when they were
10 apprehended in Italy. BURATAAKE is a professional mariner from Kiribati
11 whose name appeared on a separate Facebook account friends list (TARGET
12 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1), which is also believed to be utilized by JACQUELIN
13 for the purposes of recruiting professional mariners for the transportation of
14 cocaine via commercial vessels.
15

16 12. **Confidential Informant (CI) Information:** In March 2017, law
17 enforcement officials contacted a confidential informant (CI) in the United States
18 following the CI's involvement in a suspicious incident in British Columbia,
19 Canada onboard a commercial container vessel. The CI had admitted to Canadian
20 authorities that he/she had been involved in drug smuggling on board the vessel
21 from Colombia to Mexico. The CI has not been paid for any cooperation, nor have
22 I made any promises about avoiding prosecution. I believe, however, the CI is
23 providing information in hopes of retaining his/her job as a professional mariner
24 and to avoid prosecution. According to the CI, in February or March of 2017
25 (before the CI communicated with law enforcement), the CI along with a second
26 crewmember successfully smuggled an estimated 20 to 30 kilograms of what the
27

1 CI believed to be cocaine from Cartagena, Colombia to Manzanillo, Mexico
2 onboard that same container vessel. The suspected cocaine was contained in
3 Everlast punching bags. Of note, in the September, 2016 seizure from the M/V
4 *Cap Jackson* described above, the cocaine was also contained in Everlast punching
5 bags.

6 13. The CI said they were to be paid \$1,000 per kilogram of cocaine
7 smuggled. The CI was initially recruited by a crewmember onboard the CI's
8 vessel to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Mexico. Following the CI's initial
9 recruitment, the other crewmember began communicating with the Colombian-
10 based drug trafficking organization (DTO) TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1.
11 The CI identified the TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 account name the
12 crewmember was communicating with as "Mariana Garcia." The CI identified the
13 person communicating via TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 as a Colombian
14 female. The CI said he/she had met the female on one occasion while in port in
15 Cartagena, Colombia in February or March 2017. The CI said the DTO attempted
16 to recruit the CI to smuggle cocaine to the Pacific Northwest and Europe for future
17 smuggling events, but the CI was concerned about U.S. and European law
18 enforcement interdicting them.
19

20 14. The CI said prior to the Colombia to Mexico smuggling event
21 described above, the DTO provided the CI with a mobile telephone and the
22 Colombian telephone number 57-3013615307 (this telephone number was
23 previously identified in KABUTA's mobile telephone and listed as "Kimmy") to
24 be called for coordination during the operation. However, the CI said TARGET
25 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 is how the CI communicated with their handler the
26 most during the cocaine smuggling events in Mexico.
27

1 15. On April 25, 2017, the CI told me they were contacted via TARGET
2 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and was told the DTO had sent money to the CI's
3 family from Panama earlier that month.

4 16. On April 30, 2017, the CI said they were paid approximately \$8,000
5 to date for the smuggling event the CI had previously conducted from Colombia to
6 Mexico. The CI said he/she and the other crewmember were still owed
7 approximately \$16,000 total from the previous cocaine smuggling event.

8 17. On May 19, 2017, the CI told me they had sent a Facebook
9 Messenger request to TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and were awaiting a
10 response.
11

12 18. On May 28, 2017, the CI informed me the CI was contacted by a
13 female from TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1. The CI said the female told
14 the CI she would be in Panama "for sending money for the people who works for
15 them." [sic] Based on this investigation and my experience in investigating such
16 matters, I believe, "the people who works for them" was a direct reference to
17 maritime cocaine smugglers and those individuals structuring payments via
18 Western Union.

19 19. On May 31, 2017, I conducted a debrief of the CI in Seattle,
20 Washington. During the debrief, the CI said the female they had been
21 communicating with via TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 identified herself
22 as "JACQUELIN."
23

24 20. On June 8, 2017, the CI told me that during the previously reported
25 Mexico smuggling event, JACQUELIN contacted them via TARGET
26 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 to confirm everything was "ok" during and after when
27 the CI made the transfer at sea of the suspected cocaine in Mexico. The CI said
28

1 JACQUELIN then hired someone to send money to the CI's family as payment for
2 the cocaine smuggling event.

3 21. On June 10, 2017, the CI provided me with Western Union
4 transaction information for a Yuranis Paola AHUMADA GARCES from Panama
5 City, Panama. The CI said Yuranis AHUMADA GARCES had previously sent
6 money via Western Union from Panama to a suspected maritime drug smuggler's
7 family member following a successful maritime cocaine smuggling event.

8 22. On June 21, 2017, the CI said that JACQUELIN was recruiting the
9 CI to smuggle a load of cocaine to Europe from Colombia onboard their vessel.
10

11 23. On June 22, 2017, the CI said JACQUELIN was, "preparing the
12 food" for when they had time to meet. Based on my prior investigative experience,
13 I believe "food" was a code word for drugs or cocaine. The code word "food" has
14 been used in other parts of this investigation to mean cocaine by the DTO and
15 those tasked with smuggling cocaine.

16 24. The CI stated that JACQUELIN was attempting to prepare a "small
17 load.. as it takes time to prepare big loads." [sic] The CI said JACQUELIN
18 attempted to recruit Timea ATATA, a second crewmember onboard the CI's vessel
19 to help smuggle a load of cocaine to Europe. The CI said ATATA was too scared
20 to smuggle due to the nine Kiribati crewmembers who were previously arrested
21 while attempting to smuggle approximately 385 kilograms of cocaine to Europe
22 onboard the M/V *Rio de Janeiro* on or about October 20, 2016. ATATA was
23 identified as being a Facebook friend of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2.
24

25 25. The CI said JACQUELIN told the CI via TARGET FACEBOOK
26 ACCOUNT 1 that "the person in Spain" [sic] was a problem for her and that person
27 blamed her for the lost load of cocaine.

26. According to Western Union information, on April 11, 2017, Yuranis AHUMADA GARCES sent two wires to an individual in Tarawa, Kiribati; both wires were the same amount, \$1934.69 USD each, with one wire sent at 1:16 PM and the second sent at 4:47 PM. The wires were sent from different locations in Panama City, Panama. The payments were received in Australian dollars (\$ 2498.62 AUD each).

27. On July 18, 2017, the CI confirmed that JACQUELIN was still residing in Panama and was working toward her Panamanian citizenship.

28. On November 2, 2017, the CI said he/she also communicated with JACQUELIN on TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2. According to the CI, in October 2017, JACQUELIN asked the CI to help her find "frens" [sic] on the M/V *Monte Cervantes*. The CI provided me a screen shot from the CI's conversation with JACQUELIN via TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 where JACQUELIN stated, "I think I go to costa rica to look same work three have much ship Kiribati crew". [sic] The CI confirmed that JACQUELIN meant she intended to go to Costa Rica in order to recruit Kiribati mariners to smuggle cocaine.

29. **Western Union Transactions:** Western Union records showed that between May 31, 2016, and July 7, 2016, Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES, aka JACQUELIN sent three wires from Santamarta, Colombia to two separate Kiribati nationals in Tarawa, Kiribati. On May 31, 2016, AHUMADA GARCES sent two wires: one at 12:24 PM to Ratawa ITINNEITA in the amount of \$345.62, and the second, at 12:36 PM, for \$313.15 to Raabwa KARAWAITI. On July 7, 2016, AHUMADA GARCES sent \$265.42 to Raabwa KARAWAITI.

30. According to Western Union, on December 24, 2016 Yuranis AHUMADA GARCES sent two wires from Valledupar, Colombia to Tarawa,

1 Kiribati. Both wires originated as Colombian Pesos with a U.S. dollar value of
2 \$1,020.43 and were received in Kiribati as Australian Dollars (\$ 1388.32 AUD).
3 One wire was sent to Tariri TIANUARE and the other to Terakoua MARAITI.
4 TIANUARE has entered the U.S. on numerous occasions, and his travel patterns
5 appear to be consistent with those of a professional mariner. Of note, TIANUARE
6 was previously identified by law enforcement as one of the Kiribati mariners
7 identified on the "Mariana Garcia" Facebook account friends list.

8
9 31. According to Western Union, between August 27, 2016, and June
10 10, 2017, Yuranis AHUMADA GARCES received ten wires in Valledupar,
11 Colombia. All of these wires were from Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA
12 GARCES. Eight of the payments were sent from Panama. One payment was sent
13 from Limon, Costa Rica (\$200 USD), and one payment was sent from Tavernes de
14 la Valldinga, Spain (€100 EURO).

15 32. According to Western Union, Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA
16 GARCES conducted two Western Union transactions where she indicated her
17 email address as being BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com. The first transaction
18 occurred on September 16, 2017, where she sent \$60.00 from Panama City,
19 Panama to Christian ADARRAGA AHUMADA in Valledupar, Colombia. On
20 September 29, 2017, Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES identified her
21 email as being BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com in a transaction to Yuranis Paolo
22 AHUMADA GARCES in the amount of \$195.00. The transaction originated in
23 Panama City, Panama and the transaction was received in Valledupar, Colombia.
24 As noted above, the BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com email address was previously
25 discovered, handwritten in the notebook belonging to KABUTA during his CBP
26 secondary inspection at LAX.
27

1 33. From June 21, 2017 to September 29, 2017, Marelvis Jacquelin
 2 AHUMADA GARCES conducted 12 transactions via Western Union (including
 3 the two aforementioned transactions where she identified her email address as
 4 BRAYLIN777@hotmail.com). Nine of those transactions originated in Almirante,
 5 Panama and three originated in Panama City, Panama. On July 1, 2017, Marelvis
 6 Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES sent \$486.60 to Raimon MATANG in Tarawa,
 7 Kiribati. On August 30, 2017, Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES sent
 8 \$1074.33 to Katia Luz EGUIS Pereira in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Spain.
 9

10 34. **Law Enforcement Review of TARGET FACEBOOK**
 11 **ACCOUNTS 1 and 2:** In May 2017, law enforcement officials began capturing
 12 the information from the publicly available Facebook friends list from TARGET
 13 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1. At the time, the review of the gathered information,
 14 officers and agents identified that TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 was
 15 Facebook "friends" with 131 suspected professional mariners from the Republic of
 16 Kiribati and the country of Tuvalu.

17 35. By June 2017, the TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 name
 18 "Mariana Garcia" was changed to "Maria Garcia". On May 2, 2017, it was
 19 confirmed that although the name for TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 was
 20 changed, the Facebook ID number remained the same. I viewed the Facebook
 21 page under each name and the profile picture and profile cover were the same
 22 under both names, providing further evidence that the account remained the same
 23 with simply a name change as described above.
 24

25 36. In July 2017, TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1's previously
 26 publicly available friends list became restricted. Law enforcement officials were
 27
 28

1 no longer able to view the Facebook friends list for the "Maria Garcia" Facebook
2 account.

3 37. On September 25, 2017, I conducted a Facebook query for
4 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1. During my query, I found under the
5 "Other Names" section of the "About" tab of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT
6 1 the "Nickname" listed as "jacky".

7 38. On November 3, 2017, during a review of the TARGET
8 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2, I identified 29 of the 55 friends listed in the Facebook
9 friends list as being "friends" with TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 as well
10 as TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2. The majority of the Facebook friends
11 listed in TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 appeared to be professional
12 mariners.

13 39. As of March 2018, based on U.S. travel records, 92 of those
14 mariners identified from TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and TARGET
15 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 had previously entered the United States onboard
16 commercial vessels. From August 1, 2016, to April 11, 2018, a combined total of
17 at least 22 of the Facebook friends with the TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1
18 and TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 had traveled to or through the Western
19 District of Washington onboard commercial vessels at least 70 times.

20 40. **INITIAL SEARCH WARRANT RESPONSE:** On December 20,
21 2017, I applied for and was granted sealed federal search warrants for two
22 Facebook accounts by U.S. Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida. The authorized
23 Federal Search Warrants were for Facebook Accounts: Maria Garcia, account ID
24 100012398678974 (TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1) and Maria Tekeraoi,
25 account ID 100014362298473 (TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2).

1 41. On December 21, 2017, I served both search warrants on Facebook
2 via Facebook's Law Enforcement Portal Website. On December 22, 2017,
3 Facebook responded to the Search Warrant for TARGET FACEBOOK
4 ACCOUNT 1 with their findings. I received 1,460 pages of information from
5 Facebook for TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1. On January 8, 2018,
6 Facebook responded to the Search Warrant for TARGET FACEBOOK
7 ACCOUNT 2 with their findings. I received 529 pages of information from
8 Facebook for TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2.
9

10 42. In February 2018, investigators in Seattle determined that crew
11 members who were friends of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 were
12 onboard the M/V *Cap Jackson*, which was scheduled to leave Cartagena,
13 Colombia destined for the West Coast of the U.S. (to include Seattle,
14 Washington). Based on that and other information provided by investigators, on
15 February 4, 2018, in response to a request for assistance from investigators in
16 Seattle, Washington, Colombian law enforcement authorities along with U.S.
17 CBP Officers stationed in Colombia, interdicted 90 kilograms of cocaine onboard
18 the M/V *Cap Jackson* after the vessel departed Cartagena, Colombia.
19 Subsequent to cabin searches and crewmember interviews, Colombian authorities
20 arrested Kabokia KUAONGO and Tereke ATAIETA for attempting to smuggle
21 the approximately 90 kilograms of suspected cocaine. Both KUAONGO and
22 ATAIETA were crewmembers onboard the M/V *Cap Jackson* during the time of
23 the seizure.
24

25 43. Analysis of the original TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2
26 search warrant return showed Tereke ATAIETA as being Facebook friends with
27 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 since November 30, 2017. Further
28

1 analysis of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 identified Tebano TIROBA, an
2 oiler who was also onboard the M/V *Cap Jackson* during the time of the seizure
3 as being Facebook friends with TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2.

4 44. On February 16, 2018, Coast Guard Investigative Service and U.S.
5 Coast Guard personnel at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, California,
6 interviewed the Captain of the M/V *Cap Jackson*, Anke WIEDAU regarding the
7 cocaine seizure onboard her vessel as she departed Colombia. Captain WIEDAU
8 provided investigators with the following information: Located in ATAIETA's
9 cabin was \$1,200 USD in \$100 bills. Located on ATAIETA's mobile telephone
10 was what appeared to be a conversation between TARGET FACEBOOK
11 ACCOUNT 2 and ATAIETA. In the Facebook Messenger conversation from
12 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 it appears that JACQUELIN tells
13 ATAIETA; "Pls speak to whassap to mi friend," "For jon," "Job," "Here only me
14 jeje," "All togheten here now," "U see the whassap," "Pls," "Time is gold," "No
15 need olso piloy dawn only need time to recive fast," "Mi amor whassap or
16 onother," "Jack tekeroi," "Afther pilot dawn," "espeak wana ready," "Rope".
17 [sic] JACQUELIN also appears to tell ATAIETA via TARGET FACEBOOK
18 ACCOUNT 2, "Now boat in way," "Ligt coming," "If no posibol all only one
19 ropa now," "Is a time". [sic] Captain WIEDAU indicated that the suspected
20 cocaine was originally located on deck, near the stern of her vessel in three
21 packages and a related rope was attached to the aft railing. The screen shots of
22 this conversation show it was made on a Sunday; the seizure described above
23 occurred on Sunday, February 4, 2018. The electronic conversation described
24 above would not have been captured pursuant to the original warrant for
25
26
27
28

1 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 because it appears to have occurred after
2 the date of the execution of that warrant.

3 45. Evidence obtained through the original search warrants for
4 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2
5 showed that the accounts were Facebook friends with more than 400 people.
6 Many of the 400+ Facebook Friends appear to be professional mariners who are
7 Kiribati nationals. The search warrant evidence also revealed that multiple
8 searches from the accounts were conducted for commercial vessels. As an
9 example, the M/V *Cap Jackson* was the subject of searches originating from
10 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 on nine occasions between October 15,
11 2017, and November 8, 2017.
12

13 46. During the review of the original Federal Search Warrant return
14 information including friend requests, investigators located information for
15 **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3. TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT**
16 **3** has a listed other name as “(kimmy)”. The internet web address for **TARGET**
17 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3** is www.facebook.com/lingarces. It should be noted
18 that JACQUELIN’s full name is Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES and
19 she has utilized variations of these names when dealing with professional
20 mariners, including multiple spelling variations. The profile picture for
21 **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3** appears to be the same birthday party
22 setting with matching decorations, bottles, and pineapples in the same layout as
23 images located in the publicly available images located on **TARGET**
24 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4**. The Facebook account name utilized in **TARGET**
25 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3** is the same name previously utilized in **TARGET**
26 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1**. On April 25, 2017, the Maria Tekearoi Facebook
27
28

1 Page was utilized to search for the Mariana Garcia Facebook Page (TARGET
2 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 was used to search for TARGET FACEBOOK
3 ACCOUNT 3). On 19 April 2018, investigators searched for TARGET
4 FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 3 on Facebook and received the message, "This page
5 isn't available The link you followed may be broken, or the page may have been
6 removed." Based on previous research via Facebook, investigators believe that
7 JACQUELIN's youngest daughter is named Kimmy.

8
9 47. During the review of the original Federal Search Warrant return
10 information, investigators discovered a Facebook page for **TARGET**
11 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4. TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4** has a
12 listed other name as "(jacke)" and an internet web address of
13 www.facebook.com/jackelin.ahumada. It should be noted that JACQUELIN's
14 full name is Marelvis Jacquelin AHUMADA GARCES and she has utilized
15 variations of these names when dealing with professional mariners, including
16 multiple spelling variations. The profile picture for **TARGET FACEBOOK**
17 **ACCOUNT 4** appears to be the same child as the child depicted throughout
18 **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1**. Investigators located images of
19 JACQUELIN throughout the publicly available portion of **TARGET**
20 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4**. On February 22, 2018, Colombian investigators
21 identified Colombian telephone number +57-3008717105 (the telephone number
22 previously located in Rebuta KABUTA's mobile telephone) as being linked to
23 **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4**. The Colombian investigators also
24 provided me what appear to be images of JACQUELIN captured from **TARGET**
25 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4. TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4** appears
26 to be "Following" "Paula Andrea ISAZZA." According to an Internet
27

1 Search, Facebook provided the following information – “You automatically
2 follow people who you're friends with. You can also follow Pages (ex:
3 businesses, organizations, brands) and people who aren't your friend on Facebook
4 but allow everybody to follow them. When you follow someone or a Page, you
5 may see updates from that person or Page in your News Feed. If you like a Page,
6 you'll automatically follow it. Some Pages and well-known public figures with
7 large followings are verified by Facebook and have a blue badge next to their
8 names to help you know that they're who they claim to be.” According to Paula
9 Andrea ISAZZA’s publicly available Facebook page, the internet web address for
10 the page is www.facebook.com/paula.a.isaza.5. During this investigation, agents
11 first became aware of a Paula Andrea ISAZA following the secondary inspection
12 of Rehua KABUTA at LAX. KABUTA had Western Union receipts in his
13 possession. Two of those receipts were for transaction between Paula Andrea
14 ISAZA and Tabitha IONGA. Each transaction originated in Panama and
15 concluded in Kiribati. Each transaction was for \$2,000.00 USD (\$4,000.00 USD
16 total).

17
18 48. During the review of the original Federal Search Warrant return
19 information, investigators discovered a Facebook page for **TARGET**
20 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5**. Based on this investigation to date, I believe that
21 the TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 Messenger conversation with
22 ATAIETA, “Mi amor whassap or onother,” “Jack tekeroi,” “Afther pilot dawn,”
23 was JACQUELIN directing ATAIETA to contact her on either the WhatsApp
24 internet communication application or via another Facebook Messenger account;
25 that other Facebook Messenger account being **TARGET FACEBOOK**
26 **ACCOUNT 5**. **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5** has an internet web
27

1 address of <https://www.facebook.com/jack.tekerai.1>. In approximately February
 2 2018, investigators viewed the Facebook page of Tony KABURARA, a known
 3 Facebook friend of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 and identified him as
 4 being the sole Facebook friend of **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5**.
 5 Since that time, Tony KABURARA has been removed as the Facebook friend
 6 from **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5**. However, KAURARA is still
 7 listed as a Facebook friend with TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2 according
 8 to the federal Search Warrant return of TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2.
 9 Currently, **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 5** appears to have its friends list
 10 set to private.

11
 12 49. **UPDATED SEARCH WARRANT RESPONSE:** On March 21,
 13 2018, I applied for and was granted a sealed federal search warrant for a Facebook
 14 account by U.S. Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue. The authorized Federal
 15 Search Warrant was for Facebook Account; Maria Tekeraoi, account ID
 16 100014362298473 (**TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2**).

17 50. On March 22, 2018, I served the search warrant on Facebook via
 18 Facebook's Law Enforcement Portal Website. On April 9, 2018, Facebook
 19 responded to the Search Warrant for **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2** with
 20 their findings. I received 407 pages of information from Facebook for **TARGET**
 21 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2**.

22
 23 51. During the review of the most recent search warrant return,
 24 investigators identified both **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 6** and
 25 **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7** as being linked to **TARGET FACEBOOK**
 26 **ACCOUNT 2** through Facebook friend requests. The profile picture for **TARGET**
 27 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 6** appears to be the same child as the child depicted

1 throughout TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1, TARGET FACEBOOK
 2 ACCOUNT 2, **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 4**, and **TARGET**
 3 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7**. While reviewing the publicly available Facebook
 4 friends list of **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 6**, investigators identified
 5 Areti TEINAMOTUNA who is a Kiribati professional mariner who was previously
 6 identified as Facebook friends on both TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 1 and
 7 TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 2. The profile picture for **TARGET**
 8 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7** appears to be a picture of Marelvis Jacquelin
 9 AHUMADA GARCES aka JACQUELIN. The cover photo of **TARGET**
 10 **FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7** also appears to be an image of JACQUELIN.
 11 Investigators located images of JACQUELIN throughout the publicly available
 12 portion of **TARGET FACEBOOK ACCOUNT 7**.
 13

14 52. In conclusion, information revealed through law enforcement
 15 encounters, customs inspections, financial transactions, and a CI information
 16 revealed that there is probable cause to believe that Marelvis Jacquelin
 17 AHUMADA GARCES, aka JACQUELIN is using the **TARGET FACEBOOK**
 18 **ACCOUNT's 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7** to help facilitate cocaine smuggling from Colombia
 19 to North America and Europe via container vessels.
 20

21 **BACKGROUND RELATED TO FACEBOOK SOCIAL NETWORKING**

22 **SERVICES**

23 53. I am aware from my experience and training, and consultation with
 24 other investigators, of the following information about Facebook:

25 54. Facebook owns and operates a free-access social networking website
 26 of the same name that can be accessed at <http://www.facebook.com>. Facebook
 27 allows its users to establish accounts with Facebook, and users can then use their
 28

1 accounts to share written news, photographs, videos, and other information with
2 other Facebook users, and sometimes with the general public.

3 55. Facebook asks users to provide basic contact and personal
4 identifying information to Facebook, either during the registration process or
5 thereafter. This information may include the user's full name, birth date, gender,
6 contact e-mail addresses, Facebook passwords, Facebook security questions and
7 answers (for password retrieval), physical address (including city, state, and zip
8 code), telephone numbers, screen names, websites, and other personal identifiers.
9 Facebook also assigns a user identification number to each account.

10 56. Facebook users may join one or more groups or networks to connect
11 and interact with other users who are members of the same group or network.
12 Facebook assigns a group identification number to each group. A Facebook user
13 can also connect directly with individual Facebook users by sending each user a
14 "Friend Request." If the recipient of a "Friend Request" accepts the request, then
15 the two users will become "Friends" for purposes of Facebook and can exchange
16 communications or view information about each other. Each Facebook user's
17 account includes a list of that user's "Friends" and a "News Feed," which
18 highlights information about the user's "Friends," such as profile changes,
19 upcoming events, and birthdays.
20

21 57. Facebook users can select different levels of privacy for the
22 communications and information associated with their Facebook accounts. By
23 adjusting these privacy settings, a Facebook user can make information available
24 only to himself or herself, to particular Facebook users, or to anyone with access to
25 the Internet, including people who are not Facebook users. A Facebook user can
26 also create "lists" of Facebook friends to facilitate the application of these privacy
27

1 settings. Facebook accounts also include other account settings that users can
2 adjust to control, for example, the types of notifications they receive from
3 Facebook.

4 58. Facebook users can create profiles that include photographs, lists of
5 personal interests, and other information. Facebook users can also post “status”
6 updates about their whereabouts and actions, as well as links to videos,
7 photographs, articles, and other items available elsewhere on the Internet.
8 Facebook users can also post information about upcoming “events,” such as social
9 occasions, by listing the event’s time, location, host, and guest list. In addition,
10 Facebook users can “check in” to particular locations or add their geographic
11 locations to their Facebook posts, thereby revealing their geographic locations at
12 particular dates and times. A particular user’s profile page also includes a “Wall,”
13 which is a space where the user and his or her “Friends” can post messages,
14 attachments, and links that will typically be visible to anyone who can view the
15 user’s profile (subject to the privacy settings selected by the account user).
16

17 59. Facebook allows users to upload photos and videos. It also provides
18 users the ability to “tag” (i.e., label) other Facebook users in a photo or video.
19 When a user is tagged in a photo or video, he or she receives a notification of the
20 tag and a link to see the photo or video. For Facebook’s purposes, the photos and
21 videos associated with a user’s account will include all photos and videos uploaded
22 by that user that have not been deleted, as well as all photos and videos uploaded
23 by any user that have that user tagged in them.
24

25 60. Facebook users can exchange private messages on Facebook with
26 other users. These messages, which are similar to e-mail messages, are sent to the
27 recipient’s “Inbox” on Facebook, which also stores copies of messages sent by the
28

1 recipient, as well as other information. Facebook users can also post comments on
2 the Facebook profiles of other users or on their own profiles; such comments are
3 typically associated with a specific posting or item on the profile. In addition,
4 Facebook has a Chat feature that allows users to send and receive instant messages
5 through Facebook. These chat communications are stored in the chat history for
6 the account. Facebook also has a Video Calling feature, and although Facebook
7 does not record the calls themselves, it does keep records of the date of each call.

8
9 61. If a Facebook user does not want to interact with another user on
10 Facebook, the first user can “block” the second user from seeing his or her
11 account.

12 62. Facebook has a “like” feature that allows users to give positive
13 feedback or connect to particular pages. Facebook users can “like” Facebook posts
14 or updates, as well as webpages or content on third-party (*i.e.*, non-Facebook)
15 websites. Facebook users can also become “fans” of particular Facebook pages.

16 63. Facebook has a search function that enables its users to search
17 Facebook for keywords, usernames, or pages, among other things.

18 64. Each Facebook account has an activity log, which is a list of the
19 user’s posts and other Facebook activities from the inception of the account to the
20 present. The activity log includes stories and photos that the user has been tagged
21 in, as well as connections made through the account, such as “liking” a Facebook
22 page or adding someone as a friend. The activity log is visible to the user but
23 cannot be viewed by people who visit the user’s Facebook page.

24
25 65. Facebook Notes is a blogging feature available to Facebook users,
26 and it enables users to write and post notes or personal web logs (“blogs”), or to
27 import their blogs from other services, such as Xanga, LiveJournal, and Blogger.

1 66. The Facebook Gifts feature allows users to send virtual “gifts” to
2 their friends that appear as icons on the recipient’s profile page. Gifts cost money
3 to purchase, and a personalized message can be attached to each gift. Facebook
4 users can also send each other “pokes,” which are free and simply result in a
5 notification to the recipient that he or she has been “poked” by the sender.

6 67. Facebook also has a Marketplace feature, which allows users to post
7 free classified ads. Users can post items for sale, housing, jobs, and other items on
8 the Marketplace.

9 68. In addition to the applications described above, Facebook also
10 provides its users with access to thousands of other applications on the Facebook
11 platform. When a Facebook user accesses or uses one of these applications, an
12 update about that the user’s access or use of that application may appear on the
13 user’s profile page.

14 69. Some Facebook pages are affiliated with groups of users, rather than
15 one individual user. Membership in the group is monitored and regulated by the
16 administrator or head of the group, who can invite new members and reject or
17 accept requests by users to enter. Facebook can identify all users who are currently
18 registered to a particular group and can identify the administrator and/or creator of
19 the group. Facebook uses the term “Group Contact Info” to describe the contact
20 information for the group’s creator and/or administrator, as well as a PDF of the
21 current status of the group profile page.

22 70. Facebook uses the term “Neoprint” to describe an expanded view of
23 a given user profile. The “Neoprint” for a given user can include the following
24 information from the user’s profile: profile contact information; News Feed
25 information; status updates; links to videos, photographs, articles, and other items;
26
27
28

1 Notes; Wall postings; friend lists, including the friends' Facebook user
2 identification numbers; groups and networks of which the user is a member,
3 including the groups' Facebook group identification numbers; future and past
4 event postings; rejected "Friend" requests; comments; gifts; pokes; tags; and
5 information about the user's access and use of Facebook applications.

6 71. Facebook also retains Internet Protocol ("IP") logs for a given user
7 ID or IP address. These logs may contain information about the actions taken by
8 the user ID or IP address on Facebook, including information about the type of
9 action, the date and time of the action, and the user ID and IP address associated
10 with the action. For example, if a user views a Facebook profile, that user's IP log
11 would reflect the fact that the user viewed the profile, and would show when and
12 from what IP address the user did so.

14 72. Social networking providers like Facebook typically retain
15 additional information about their users' accounts, such as information about the
16 length of service (including start date), the types of service utilized, and the means
17 and source of any payments associated with the service (including any credit card
18 or bank account number). In some cases, Facebook users may communicate
19 directly with Facebook about issues relating to their accounts, such as technical
20 problems, billing inquiries, or complaints from other users. Social networking
21 providers like Facebook typically retain records about such communications,
22 including records of contacts between the user and the provider's support services,
23 as well as records of any actions taken by the provider or user as a result of the
24 communications.

26 73. Therefore, the computers of Facebook are likely to contain all the
27 material described above, including stored electronic communications and

1 information concerning subscribers and their use of Facebook, such as account
 2 access information, transaction information, and other account information. I
 3 believe such information is likely to help me locate the fugitive described in this
 4 affidavit.

5 **INFORMATION TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE SEIZED**

6 74. I anticipate executing this warrant under the Electronic
 7 Communications Privacy Act, in particular 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2703(b)(1)(A)
 8 and 2703(c)(1)(A), by using the warrant to require Facebook to disclose to the
 9 government copies of the records and other information (including the content of
 10 communications) for the Target Facebook Account described in Attachment A, as
 11 more particularly described in Section I of Attachment B. Upon receipt of the
 12 information described in Section I of Attachment B, government-authorized
 13 persons will review that information to locate the items described in Section II of
 14 Attachment B.
 15

16 **REQUEST FOR NONDISCLOSURE AND SEALING**

17 75. The government requests, pursuant to the preclusion of notice provisions
 18 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2705(b), that Facebook be ordered not to notify
 19 any person (including the subscriber or customer to which the materials relate) of the
 20 existence of this warrant for such period as the Court deems appropriate. The
 21 government submits that such an order is justified because notification of the existence of
 22 this Order would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation. Such a disclosure would
 23 give the subscriber an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior,
 24 notify confederates, or flee or continue any flight from prosecution.

25 76. It is further respectfully requested that this Court issue an order
 26 sealing, until further order of the Court, all papers submitted in support of this
 27 application, including the application and search warrant. I believe that sealing
 28

1 this document is necessary because the items and information to be seized are
2 relevant to an ongoing investigation, and law enforcement may attempt to conduct
3 searches and intercept large shipments of controlled substances. Premature
4 disclosure of the contents of this affidavit and related documents may have a
5 significant and negative impact on the continuing investigation and may severely
6 jeopardize its effectiveness.

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28 AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY D. STINSON


USAO No. 2016R01231 - 27

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CONCLUSION

77. Based on the forgoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant because it is "a court of competent jurisdiction" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711. *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court is "a district court of the United States . . . that – has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated." 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law enforcement officer is not required for the service or execution of this warrant. Accordingly, by this Affidavit and Warrant I seek authority for the government to search all of the items specified in Section I, Attachment B (attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein) to the Warrant, and specifically to seize all of the data, documents and records that are identified in Section II to that same Attachment.

Respectfully submitted,


Terry D. Stinson
Special Agent
Coast Guard Investigative Service

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27 day of April, 2018.


MARY ALICE THEILER
United States Magistrate Judge